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A capabilities approach to best interests assessments 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is an accepted principle of domestic and international law and policy that the welfare or 
best interests of the child must be the primary or paramount consideration in any decision 
made with regard to that child’s upbringing.1 While this ‘best interests standard’ has 
become a core principle of welfare law, what might constitute a child or young person’s best 
interests is given very little formal shape or content.2 This has provoked sustained criticism 
from practitioners, academics and - at times - the judiciary. Much of this criticism has 
coalesced around the question of values, where it is claimed that the standard either lacks 
an underpinning framework of values to guide assessments, or that it enables prejudicial 
values to shape assessments with this then shielded by claims that the standard is neutral.3 
Notwithstanding this longstanding criticism, there has been limited success in offering 
credible alternatives to this flawed orthodoxy.4 
                                                          
*I would like to thank Ray Carr and Joshua Warburton for research assistance and Beth Goldblatt, Rosie 
Harding, Helen Stalford and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. 
1 For an account of the historical emergence and development of the best interests standard, see A Daly 
Children, Autonomy, and the Courts (Leiden: Brill, 2018) pp 73-82. 
2 In the UK and a number of other jurisdictions, the best interests standard is also mobilised in decision-making 
involving people who are deemed to lack capacity. This is enshrined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. A 
growing literature has questioned the legitimacy of this standard in light of the requirements of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. See, for example, R Harding ‘The rise of statutory wills 
and the limits of best interests decision-making in inheritance’ (2015) 78(6) Mod L Rev 945; L Series ‘The place 
of wishes and feelings in best interests decisions: Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B’ (2016) 79(6) Mod L Rev 1101; C 
Johnston ‘Patient narrative: an “on-switch” for evaluating best interests’ (2016) 38(3) JSWL 249; M Donnelly, 
‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to say Goodbye?’ (2016) 24(3) Med L Rev 318. While the 
argument presented here draws on shared criticisms of the standard in both contexts, the proposed reforms 
address only those assessments concerning children. 
3 See below section ‘Criticism of the standard and the question of values’. 
4 For an example of a positive intervention, see Daly, above n 1. Daly’s ‘Children’s Autonomy Principle’ is 
considered in the penultimate section, ‘Implementing the capabilities approach in law’. It is also worth 
acknowledging the work that has taken place in bioethics to argue that best interests needs to be 
supplemented by a consideration of ‘harm’. See, most influentially, D Diekema ‘Parental refusals of medical 
treatment: the harm principle as threshold for state intervention’ (2004) 25 Theoretical Medicine and 
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In response, this article argues that the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen, 
Martha Nussbaum, and others can give best interests assessments much needed normative 
content, thereby addressing many of the criticisms directed at the standard. The approach 
provides a theoretically nuanced framework for ‘theorizing about basic social justice’5 and 
for evaluation, deliberation, and policy development across social welfare sectors.6 
Grounded in significant and on-going theoretical and empirical work, the framework 
provides that well-being and justice are best conceptualised in terms of people’s 
capabilities; that is the ‘options or choices open to the person’.7 The theory focuses on what 
is required from states (and others) in order to foster individual opportunity or freedom, 
and - through this - human well-being and flourishing. As Sridhar Venkatapuram 
summarises, advocates of the approach: ‘champion the central idea that the well-being of 
individuals is best reflected in and promoted through their capabilities to be and do.’8 In 
arguing for the adoption of a capabilities approach to best interests assessments, this article 
sets out an agenda for change. It addresses the conceptual and methodological justifications 
for this change, and explores the empirical work that would need to take place. Further, it 
identifies the steps and underlying principles necessary for a best interests process aligned 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bioethics 243. However, this has faced some of the same criticism; specifically, that it fails to address the key 
issue of indeterminacy. As Giles Birchley argues, ‘All we have done is rename the best interests test while 
dealing with none of its failings’, G Birchley ‘Harm is all you need? Best interests and disputes about parental 
decision-making’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical Ethics 111, p 114. The idea that ‘harm’ has a pivotal role in the 
test was recently rejected by the court in Re Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, 20 105. See E Cave and E 
Nottingham ‘Who knows best (interests)? The case of Charlie Gard’ (2017) 26(3) Med L Rev 500 
5 M Nussbaum Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2011) p 18. 
6 See, for example, ibid; A Sen ‘Equality of what?’ in SM McMurrin (ed), The Tanner Lectures on Human Value 
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980) pp 195-220; A Sen Inequality Re-examined (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1992); M Nussbaum and A Sen (eds) The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); A Sen 
Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and A Sen The Idea of Justice (London: 
Penguin, 2010); M Nussbaum Women and Human Development: The Capabilities approach (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
7 DA Crocker ‘Functioning and capability: the foundation of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s development ethic, part II’ 
in M Nussbaum and J Glover (eds) Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) p 162. 
8 S Venkatapuram Health Justice (Oxford: Polity, 2011). 
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with the capabilities approach. As such, the necessary foundations for a radical 
reconceptualization of best interests assessments are provided. 
The article starts by outlining the best interests standard, including an account of the 
criticism the standard has attracted, before the capabilities approach is then introduced. 
This is followed by a theoretical justification for its mobilisation in best interests 
assessments based on the rights of children and the broader societal interest in human 
development. The practical dimensions and application of the approach are also explored, 
foregrounding its flexibility and adaptability. In arguing that the capabilities approach can 
provide the underpinning values and deliberative framework for best interests assessments, 
the development of capabilities lists relevant to the lives of children are considered. This 
exploration highlights the empirical work mandated by the approach which embeds the 
commitment to agency into its operationalization. The Children’s Measurement Framework 
(CMF) developed by the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) for measuring 
inequalities experienced by children provides an illustrative focus.9 
In delivering this response to long identified deficits in the current legal standard, it is not 
argued that we should jettison the best interests standard.10 Rather, given its ‘powerful 
symbolic meaning’11 and entrenched position in law and policy, it is argued that the 
capabilities approach can provide an appropriate framework for the pragmatic adjudication 
                                                          
9 Equality and Human Rights Commission Measurement Framework for Equality and Human Rights (2017), 
available at https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/measurement-framework-
interactive.pdf  
10 Aoife Daly also argues for retaining the standard on the basis that it necessitates that we focus on the child’s 
interests (above n 1, p 82), but argues that it is flawed in the way children’s wishes are treated. Helen Stalford 
and Kathryn Hollingsworth similarly defend the best interest principle arguing that current weaknesses in its 
application derive - in part - from the general failure to recognise best interest as a distinct right.  H Stalford 
and K Hollingsworth ‘Judging children’s rights: tendencies, tensions, constraints, and opportunities’ in H 
Stalford, K Hollingsworth, and S Gilmore (eds) Rewriting Children’s Rights Judgments: From Academic Vision to 
New Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2017) p 35. 
11 E Godbout, C Parent, and MC Saint-Jacques ‘Positions taken by judges and custody experts on issues relating 
to the best interests of children in custody disputes in Québec’ (2015) 29(3) IJLPF 272, p 273. 
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involved in best interests determinations.12 John Coggon has identified the standard as a 
‘construct’ rather than as a single concept,13 with law aiming to provide ‘questions and 
processes… that work to make it legitimate.’14 This article addresses weaknesses in existing 
efforts to structure deliberation and secure legitimacy. 
The capabilities approach has long been influential in low and middle income countries and 
in development studies and policy.15 For instance, since 1990 the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Reports have used capabilities as a 
measure of inter-country quality of life comparisons and to articulate goals for public 
policy.16 In the last two decades scholars have begun to apply the approach to high-income 
countries, with areas such as education, health, and welfare policy identified as sites where 
the capability approach has much to contribute.17 The aim here is to further advance the 
development of the approach in two regards. First, where the approach has been 
operationalised it has primarily been for measurement and monitoring. The argument 
presented here explores its function as a deliberative framework for assessing and 
promoting individual best interests. Second, while prominent in development studies, 
economics, philosophy, and health sciences amongst other disciplines, legal scholars have 
been somewhat tentative in comparison in exploring the utility of this framework.18 In 
                                                          
12 S McGuinness ‘Best interests and pragmatism’ (2008) 16(3) Health Care Anal 208. 
13 J Coggon ‘Best interests, public interest, and the power of the medical profession’ (2008) 16 Health Care 
Anal 219, p 220. 
14 Ibid. 
15 S Alkire Valuing Freedoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
16 A Sen ‘A decade of human development’ (2000) 1 Journal of Human Development 17. 
17 S Anand, F Peter and A Sen (eds) Public Health, Ethics and Equity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); P 
Anand and P Dolan (eds) ‘Equity, capabilities and health’ (2005) 60(2) Social Science and Medicine 219; and P 
Dolan and JA Olsen Distributing Health Care: Economic and Ethical Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
18 While the approach has made less impact on legal studies than some other disciplines, see the following 
examples from legal scholars: S Deakin The ‘Capability’ Concept and the Evolution of European Social Policy 
(ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper no 303, 1, 2005); BA Goldblatt 
'Gender and social assistance in the first decade of democracy: A case study of South Africa's Child Support 
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providing a detailed justification for its adoption in child law, the aim is not only to address 
the failing best interest standard, but also encourage a greater engagement with the 
capabilities approach in legal studies and practice.  
THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD 
Section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 provides that: 
When a court determines any question with respect to -  
(a) the upbringing of a child; or 
(b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising 
from it, 
the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. 
Article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) similarly 
states: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
Welfare and best interests have become synonymous and in some contexts are used 
interchangeably.  This, of course, raises concerns regarding clarity and consistency. Further, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Grant' (2005) 32(2) Politikon 239; S Deakin and A Koukiadaki The Capability Approach and Corporate 
Restructuring: UK Sectoral and Enterprise-based Case Studies (Resources Rights and Capabilities in Europe, 
Cambridge Centre for Business Research 50, 2009); S Deakin and R Rogowski ‘Reflexive labour law, capabilities 
and the future of social Europe’ in R Rogowski, R Salais, and N Whiteside Transforming European Employment 
Policy: Labour Market Transitions and the Promotion of Capability (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011); R Dixon 
and M Nussbaum ‘Children’s rights and a capabilities approach: the question of special priority’ (2012) 97 
Cornell Law Review 549, p 564; M Fox and M Thomson ‘Realising social justice in public health law’ (2013) 
21(2) Med L Rev 278; R Del Punta ‘Labour law and the capability approach’ (2016) 32(4) International Journal 
of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 383; R Claassen and A Gerbrandy ‘Rethinking European 
competition law: from a consumer welfare to a capability approach’ (2016) 12(1) Utrecht Law Review 1. 
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Helen Stalford and Kathryn Hollingsworth note that in the UK the judiciary favour welfare, 
‘perhaps because it chimes with a traditional, paternalistic approach to protecting 
children.’19 This focus on welfare, perpetuating ideas of ‘benevolence and charity’, 
undermines the concept of best interests as a distinct children’s right:  
[T]he implication is that by engaging in a rigorous welfare assessment, particularly if 
it is treated as of paramount importance compared to other considerations, the 
courts are automatically fulfilling their obligations pertaining to children’s rights. But 
the conflation of these two concepts has obscured and even undermined the 
currency of best interests as a distinct ‘right’ and perpetuated… narrower 
paternalistic interpretations.20  
It is important to acknowledge that notwithstanding these problems and the criticisms 
detailed below, some judges deliver rigorous best interest assessments. As Stalford and 
Hollingsworth note, ‘Many judges navigate this role with notable skill and humanity to 
produce inspired decisions, sometimes in the context of highly complex, legally technical 
cases.’21 Here they draw attention to two judgements by Lady Hale.22 It is also worth noting 
Lord Justice Munby who has done much to positively develop best interests jurisprudence, 
asserting the need for the ‘judicial reasonable parent’ to reflect changing community 
                                                          
19 Stalford and Hollingsworth, above n 10, p 34. 
20 Ibid, p 35. Further difficulties arise with differing detail in the formulations, whether this is reliance on 
‘paramount’ or ‘primary’ at international and domestic levels, or the shift between ‘a primary’ and ‘the 
primary’ within different UK provisions. For a consideration of the different phrasing, see D Archard Children 
Rights & Childhood (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2004) p 67. 
21 Stalford and Hollingsworth above n 10, p 30. 
22 ZH v (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4; [2011] 2 AC 166 or R (on the 
application of SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16; [2015] 1 WLR 1449. 
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standards.23 In particular, Munby LJ has emphasised the importance of engaging community 
expectations around tolerance and the overarching obligation on parents to promote the 
opportunities of children and young people, a core objective of the capabilities approach 
and a point returned to below.24 Notwithstanding such examples, it can be concluded that 
‘children are routinely prey to poor judicial processes and decision-making tendencies, often 
with damaging consequences for the individual child… and for children’s rights more 
generally.’25 In terms of poor decision-making tendencies, Stalford and Hollingsworth 
highlight the reliance on fixed conceptualisations of children and childhood, continuing 
failure to see children as rights-holders, the undermining of children’s autonomy, and the 
‘tendency to obscure best interests assessments’.26 This final observation joins the wide-
ranging and sustained criticism of the standard that is addressed in the next section. 
Criticism of the standard and the question of values 
It has long been argued that the best interests standard lacks content;27 leaving it 
unacceptably vague,28 opaque,29 and vacuous.30 This underpins claims that it is 
indeterminate,31 uncertain,32 and unpredictable;33 resembling ‘a sociological model rather 
                                                          
23 See, for example, Re G (Children) [2012] EWCA 1233 and Re M (Children) [2017] EWCA Civ 2164. For a 
discussion of these cases, see D Monk, ‘Muscular Liberalism and the best interests of the child’ (2018) 77 (2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 261. 
24 See below, at n 106. 
25 Stalford and Hollingsworth above n 10, p 30. 
26 Ibid. 
27 I Kennedy Treat Me Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 
28 Daly above n 1, p 72. R Mnookin ‘Child-custody adjudication: judicial functions in the face of indeterminacy’ 
(1975) 39 Law and Contemporary Problems 226 
29 Birchley above n 4. 
30 J Eekelaar ‘The role of the best interests principle in decisions affecting children and decisions about 
children’ (2015) 23(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 3. 
31 Birchley above n 4, p 111.  
32 McGuinness above n 12, p 210. 
33 S Choudhry ‘Best interests in the MCA 2005 – What can healthcare law learn from family law’ (2008) 16(3) 
Health Care Anal 240; HJ Taylor ‘What are “best interests”? A critical evaluation of “best interests” decision-
making in clinical practice’ (2016) 24(2) Med L Rev 176. 
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than a solid juridical standard.’34 More specifically, it is charged that it operates to advance 
parental and professional interests and values,35 where it may be conflated with ‘best 
medical interests’,36 or may obscure the prejudices and common-sense notions of decision-
makers,37 judiciary,38 and wider society.39 As Aoife Daly has recently argued, the principle is 
‘drastically failing children’.40 
Whilst space precludes an engagement with all aspects of this criticism, it is possible to 
understand and order this criticism by reference to the question of values. The concerns are 
that assessments are made with either no regard to values, or with values that we would 
now see as unacceptable. These two positions are elaborated below. In the last part of this 
section a further concern regarding values is raised. The best interests standard is a feature 
of welfare law across different contexts and jurisdictions. While the current focus is 
decision-making with and for children and young people, the following section also draws 
on criticisms that have been generated in response to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). 
While each is served by a distinct developmental history and jurisprudence which makes 
aspects of their application distinct, they share a number of fundamental weaknesses.  
While these criticisms can be brought together, reform considerations differ, particularly the 
pressing question of whether best interests provisions of the MCA are compliant with the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities.41  
                                                          
34 Daly above n 1, p 94. 
35 M Fox and M Thomson ‘Reconsidering “best interests”: male circumcision and the rights of the child’ in G 
Denniston, F Hodges, and M Milos (eds) Circumcision and Human Rights (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009) 15. 
36 Taylor above n 33. 
37 P Fennell ‘Best interests and treatment for mental disorder’ (2008) 16(3) Health Care Anal 255 
38 J Eekelaar ‘”Trust the judges”: how far should family law go?’ 7(5) Mod Law Rev 593; M King ‘Playing the 
symbols – custody and the Law Commission’ (1987) 17(4) FL 186; J Harrington ‘Deciding best interests: medical 
progress, clinical judgement, and the “good family”’ [2003] Web JCLI 81. 
39 A Diduck and F Kaganas Family Law, Gender and the State (Oxford: Hart, 2006), p 301. 
40 Daly above n 1, p 9. 
41 See above n 2. 
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NO VALUES 
Writing extra-judicially, Munby LJ has argued that what is meant by best interests is ‘neither 
self-evident nor altogether clear.’ He notes that courts have given ‘surprisingly little 
consideration’ to the question, and notwithstanding continued criticism, they have ‘failed, 
and even on occasions refused to articulate any principles or values to be applied in 
operating the best interests test.’42 Also commenting on this failure to articulate values, 
Brennan J observes that the standard abrogates the decision-making to experts. Thus, a 
‘complex moral and social question’ is transformed ‘into a question of fact… in the hands of 
“experts” who assemble a dossier of fact and opinion on matters which they deem 
relevant’.43 Related to this, we have at times seen aspects of welfare unitised with benefits 
and disbenefits tallied with little or no normative reasoning or justification. We see this very 
clearly in Lord Justice Thorpe’s direction in Re A (medical treatment: male sterilisation) 
[2000] that a judge making a best interests evaluation should ‘draw up a balance sheet’, 
weighing ‘factors of actual benefit’ against ‘any counter balancing dis-benefits’.44 This has 
proved to be a popular direction to lower courts, and perhaps it is superficially attractive, 
but it does beg serious questions as to how fundamental rights are treated within such 
calculations.45  
THE WRONG VALUES 
The best interests standard works on individualised assessments and prediction. Here the 
courts have been at pains to stress that they judge each case on its unique merits and that 
                                                          
42 LJ Munby ‘Consent to treatment’ in A Grubb, J Laing, and J McHale (eds) Principles of Medical Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1992), p 548. 
43  Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 270 per Brennan J  
44 Re A (medical treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
45 M Fox and M Thomson ‘Bodily integrity, embodiment, and the regulation of parental choice’ (2017) 44(4) J 
Law & Soc 501. 
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the calculation is an individual exercise removed from generalisations.46 Yet, it has been 
contended that assessments and decisions are informed by more than the facts of each 
individual case. Indeed, the claim to the uniqueness of each case has itself been seen as a 
means of obscuring the values engaged by judges in their reasoning.47 In this, the test has 
been criticised as being too subjective and allowing room for personal prejudice in decision-
making.48 Others, however, argue that rather than individual prejudice, the current standard 
obscures the influence of systemic or societal values or prejudices, acting as an ‘alibi for 
dominant ideology’.49 Helen Reece, for instance, argues that the indeterminacy of child 
welfare knowledge has allowed other values to ‘exert an influence from behind the smoke 
screen of the paramountcy principle.’50 This can include, for example, prejudices shaped by 
heteronormative or ‘pro-Christian/”Western”’51 sentiment or bias. Alison Diduck and Felicity 
Kaganas argue that the way best interests are interpreted and determined owes less to 
scientific evidence than to ‘understandings of the welfare of children that accord with 
prevailing beliefs about how families should be structured and what the roles of family 
members should be.’52  
VALUES AND EVIDENCE 
It is also important to approach the question of values from the perspective of evidence. 
Jonathan Herring and Charles Foster observe that behind judicial determinations of best 
                                                          
46 See, Diduck and Kaganas above n 39. 
47 See, D Bradley ‘Homosexuality and Child Custody in English Law’ (1987) 1(2) IJLPF 155. 
48 See, Eekelaar above n 38; King, above n 38. 
49 I Thery ‘”The interests of the child” and the regulation of post-divorce family’ in C Smart and S Sevenhuijsen 
(eds) Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (London: Routledge, 1989), p 81. 
50 H Reece ‘The paramountcy principle: consensus or construct’ (1996) 49(1) Current Legal Problems 267, pp 
295-6. Diduck and Kaganas above n 39, p 301. See also, Harrington, above n 38. 
51 Daly above n 1. 
52 Diduck and Kaganas above n 39, p 301. 
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interests ‘there lies an essentially Aristotelian notion of “the good life”’.53 More generally, 
they contend that it ‘is a routine part of judicial business to take a view about what human 
beings quintessentially are and how they can best live.’54 However, even while Herring and 
Foster go so far as to assert that a ‘judge’s job in determining best interests can more 
accurately be described as maximising the flourishing of the human in question’ and 
‘facilitat[ing] human thriving’,55 they nevertheless argue against a philosophically explicit 
framework: 
In the vast majority of cases there is little dispute over what is in a person’s best 
interests. In the truly difficult cases it is unlikely that a more detailed list of factors 
would create any more predictability than the straightforward best interests test…. 
Further,… a philosophically explicit protocol would quickly become tyrannous.56 
This proposition is logically sustainable. Judges engage with an idea of the ‘good life’ and we 
probably want them to do this, but to articulate this with any detail in a protocol or best 
interests framework could be undesirable depending on how this is operationalised. 
Nevertheless, acknowledging that the judiciary (and others) engage particular values – 
importing ‘a normative view of the good life into their best interests determinations… saying 
that it is better for human beings to live in the prescribed way’57 – should lead us to 
question what these values might be, especially in light of the criticism we have seen of the 
standard.58 This is particularly important in the context of prejudice and discriminatory 
                                                          
53 J Herring and C Foster ‘Welfare means relationality, virtue and altruism’ (2012) 32 LS 480, p 492. 
54 Ibid, p 492, 494. 
55 Ibid, p 496-7. 
56 Ibid, p 483. 
57 Ibid, p 493-4. 
58 As Daly writes, the standard ‘permits the imposition not only of society’s dominant values, but those values 
of the types of individuals that become judges – generally white, middle class males (and always adults, of 
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values. Against this background, it is argued that it is better to be explicit about the values 
informing calculations, and to work with an evidence-base, even at the risk of this becoming 
tyrannous. 
The next section introduces the capabilities approach before providing theoretical and 
practical justifications for its mobilisation in the current context. The approach can respond 
to the need for a robust theoretical framework underpinned by an evidence-base to inform 
our understanding of the ‘good life’ and human flourishing. As Giles Birchley argues, the 
best response to the key weakness of indeterminacy is ‘specifying the values that should 
guide best interests decisions.’59  
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
Beginning with Sen’s Tanner Lecture ‘Equality of What?’,60 Sen, Nussbaum, and others have 
developed the capabilities approach in four decades of work.61 The approach provides the 
theoretical foundations for an alternative understanding of human flourishing and 
development. According to Nussbaum, it holds that: ‘the key question to ask, when 
comparing societies and assessing them for their basic decency or justice, is, “What is each 
person able to do and to be?”’62 Thus, it is argued that well-being and justice are best 
conceptualised in terms of people’s capabilities to function; that is, their ‘effective 
opportunities to undertake the actions and activities that they want to engage in, and be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
course.) There is evidence that judges’ subjective preferences, rather than rational argumentation, may 
determine the outcome of cases.’ Above n 1, p 94. 
59 Birchley above n 4, p 111. 
60 Sen (1980) above n 6, pp 195-220. 
61 See, for example, A Sen Poverty and Famines (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Sen (1992), above n 6;  
Nussbaum and Sen (eds), above n 6; Sen (1999), above n 6; Sen (2010), above n 6.  
62 Nussbaum above n 5, p 18. 
 
Page | 13 
 
whom they want to be’.63 All capabilities together correspond to the overall freedom a 
person has to lead a life they have reason to value. It follows that the expansion of human 
capabilities should be the primary goal of public policy. 
The approach can be understood as ethically individualistic. It takes each person as an end, 
providing a ‘necessary counter-theory’64 to models of welfare or development that rely on 
aggregated or averaged well-being, or familiar proxy measurements such as gross domestic 
or national product.65 As such, the human development agenda is (re-)orientated towards 
individuals within a society rather than abstracted calculations. As Sen states, the 
capabilities approach ‘proposes a serious departure from concentrating on the means of 
living to the actual opportunities of living.’66 This attention to freedom or opportunity 
underpins a key focus on agency: 
[T]he crucial good societies should be promoting for their people is a set of 
opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise 
in action: the choice is theirs. It thus commits itself to respect for people’s powers of 
self-definition.67 
In focusing on freedoms or opportunities, an important element of the approach is the 
attention paid to factors that influence the ability of individuals to convert resources into 
functionings; that is, to achieve what they want to be and do. These conversion factors 
                                                          
63 I Robeyns ‘The capability approach: a theoretical survey’ (2005) 6(1) Journal of Human Development 93, p 
95. 
64 Nussbaum above n 5, ch 3.  
65 Sen (2010) above n 6, p 48. The move from resources to opportunities also challenges the economic 
instrumentalism of the human capital paradigm. As Dreze and Sen note, the ‘bettering of a human life does 
not have to be justified by showing that a person with a better life is also a better producer.’ J Dreze and A Sen, 
India: Development and Participation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p 184. 
66 Sen (2010) above n 6, p 17. 
67 Nussbaum above n 5, p 18. 
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address the social, institutional, and structural arrangements that prevent or enable an 
individual’s capacities to become effective opportunities and freedoms.68 As Caroline Hart 
and Nicolas Brando explain: 
They range from legal structures, environmental and social conditions to the most 
specific resources and skills needed to exercise freedoms. To be free to read, for 
example, children not only have to possess particular cognitive skills, but they 
strongly depend on the appropriate external conditions that allow them to 
effectively exercise this freedom.69 
Sen and Nussbaum have worked together and separately in the development of the 
approach.70 In both regards they share philosophical debts; notably to Aristotle, Adam Smith 
and Marx. They also share foundational concerns with human flourishing, freedom, and 
agency. Nevertheless, they have ultimately articulated quite different models. Some of this 
is a function of their disciplinary backgrounds: Sen is an economist and philosopher, 
Nussbaum a philosopher, legal theorist, and constitutional lawyer. Sen has sought a tool 
adaptable within policy contexts (for example, health and development), while Nussbaum 
has sought to articulate a universal framework of constitutional entitlements.71 Much 
academic literature has focused on these differences,72 and a particular concern has been 
the question of capabilities lists. While Nussbaum has generated a list of ten capabilities,73 
                                                          
68 CS Hart and N Brando ‘A capability approach to children’s well-being, agency and participatory rights in 
education’ (2018) 53(3) European Journal of Education 293, p 298. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Eg Nussbaum and Sen above n 6. 
71 For a discussion of the differences in their work see Crocker, above n 7, parts 1 and 2. 
72 It is arguable that too much attention has been paid to the differences with commentators forgetting that 
their ‘approaches are very closely related’ and that they are ‘allies in their critique of theories such as 
utilitarianism.’ Robeyns above n 63, 103.  
73 Nussbaum has provided a list of central human capabilities although she stresses that any list must be 
subject to ongoing revision. She lists: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; 
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Sen cautions against framing a definitive list (‘a grand mausoleum’74) of capabilities. For Sen, 
the scope and valuation of capabilities in each context should be influenced ‘by our own 
continued scrutiny and by the reach of public discussion’.75 This reflects individual and 
collective agency. At the same time he has returned to certain basic capabilities such as 
education and health, and he has offered examples of intrinsically valuable capabilities 
(including being able to ‘live long, escape avoidable morbidity, be well nourished, be able to 
read, write and communicate’.76) It is also helpful to note that Sen articulates capabilities in 
terms of an evaluative ‘space’,77 with others referring to an informational or 
multidimensional space.78  
The argument presented here draws on the work of both scholars, in part because of their 
shared foundational focus on human flourishing. It is important to note in this regard the 
degree to which they draw on Aristotle79 and to recall Herring and Foster’s assertion that an 
idea of the Aristotelian ‘good life’ underpins judicial best interests assessments.80 The 
detailed work to clearly articulate what the ‘good life’ might require in terms of social and 
institutional scaffolding is important in this context. Beyond this, the argument relies on 
Sen’s work to develop and defend the approach as a deliberative space that is responsive to 
context through the development of specific capabilities lists. The next section provides a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and political and material control over one’s 
environment. M Nussbaum ‘Well-being, contracts and capabilities’ in L Manderson (ed) Rethinking Well-Being 
(Perth, API Network, 2005) 27-44, pp 41-2. See also, Nussbaum above n 5. 
73 Sen (2010) above n 6, p 242. 
74 A Sen ‘Capabilities, lists, and public reason: continuing the conversation’ in B Agarwal, J Humphries, I 
Robeyns, Amartya Sen’s Work and Ideas: A Gender Perspective (London: Routledge, 2005) p 337. 
75 Sen (2010), above n 6, p 242. 
76 A Sen Resources, Values and Development (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984), p 497. 
77 A Sen (1992) above n 6, p 43. 
78 J Ballet, M Biggeri, and F Comim ‘Children’s agency and the capability approach: a conceptual framework’ in 
M Biggeri, J Ballet, and F Comim (eds) Children and the Capability Approach (London: Palgrave, 2011) p 34. 
79 See, JM Alexander Capabilities and Social Justice: The Political Philosophy of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 125. 
80 Herring and Foster above n 53, p 482. 
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theoretical justification for utilising the capabilities approach in best interests assessments 
before returning to the question of lists. 
Theoretical justifications for a capabilities approach to best interests assessments 
Children do not feature prominently in what could be characterised as the founding 
literature of the approach. That is not to say, however, that children’s importance to the 
human development project is not appreciated by the main architects. Indeed, Martha 
Nussbaum has subsequently argued, with Rosalind Dixon, that the approach is ‘in its very 
nature intensely focused on early childhood, as a time when critical forms of support for 
development are either present or absent.’81 
In the growing body of work that addresses children and capabilities, it is argued that 
attending to children’s capabilities has a positive impact both at a personal and societal 
level. This can be translated to the two themes that Biggeri and Santi have identified as 
emerging in the field; that is, the ‘process of evolving capabilities’, and the idea of ‘capable 
agents’.82 The notion of evolving capabilities attempts to capture the dynamic interplay of 
capacity, opportunity and agency.83 This recognises the complexity of promoting capabilities 
and foregrounds innate capacities, the fact that relevant capabilities change across the life 
course, and the central place of participation in decision-making. The idea of capable 
                                                          
81 Dixon and Nussbaum, above n 18, p 563-4. 
82 M Biggeri and M Santi ‘The missing dimensions of children’s well-being and well-becoming in education 
systems: capabilities and philosophy for children’ (2012) 13(3) Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 
373, p 377. 
83 Ibid. See, JM Bonvin and D Stoecklin, ‘Children’s Rights as Evolving Capabilities: Towards a Contextualized 
and Processual Conception of Social Justice’ (2016) 23(3) Ethical Perspectives 19-39. 
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agents, on the other hand, reflects the idea that human development ‘relies on people’s 
freedom to make decisions and to advance key objectives as agents of change’.84 
It is important to note that the capabilities approach, and particularly the focus on ‘evolving 
capabilities’, aligns with other work that has sought to articulate and promote children’s 
rights. Most notable in this context is Joel Feinberg’s argument that children possess a right 
to an open future. Feinberg divides children’s rights into two classes: dependency rights 
(which derive from the child’s dependence on others) and rights-in-trust (which the child is 
not yet capable of exercising, but which must be protected so that they can be exercised by 
the future adult).85 Rights-in-trust vary in content, but are essentially rights ‘given to the 
child in the person of the adult she will become’.86 Consequently the child should be 
‘permitted to reach maturity with as many open options, opportunities and advantages as 
possible’.87 It has been argued that bodily integrity and self-determination provide the 
foundations of a child’s right to an open future.88 Self-determination is clearly an important 
aspect of the concern with agency at the heart of the capabilities approach. The approach 
enriches our understanding of what self-determination means and the structural support it 
requires.  
Feinberg, and others such as John Eekelaar,89 articulate models that are consistent with the 
capabilities approach’s focus on agency and maximising opportunity or freedom.90 It should 
                                                          
84 Biggeri and Santi above n 82 p 378. 
85 J Feinberg ‘The child’s right to an open future’ in W Aiken and H La Follette (eds) Whose Child? Children’s 
Rights, Parental Authority and State Power (Totowa: NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), pp 125-126. 
86 D Archard Children, Family and the State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003) p 31. 
87 Feinberg above n 85, p 130. 
88 A Ouellette ‘Eyes wide open: surgery to westernize the eyes of an Asian child’ (2009) 39 The Hastings Center 
Report 15. See also, Fox and Thomson above n 45. 
89 See, J Eekelaar ‘The interests of the child and the child’s wishes: the role of dynamic self-determinism’ 
(1994) 8 IJLPF 42 at 48. 
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be noted that the approach, like Feinberg’s model, has been criticised as too future-
orientated; more interested in the adult the child will become than the child herself.91 
Indeed, it is fair to note that immediate well-being interests and gains are often downplayed 
in the literature which can tend to focus instead on the future adult. This can be 
characterised as part of the broader tendency to see children and young people as ‘human 
becomings’ with their future as adults privileged over their present.92 
Whilst it can be persuasively argued that both the capabilities approach and the child’s right 
to an open future should properly be understood as offering protections and benefits to the 
child in the capacity of the person they are, this is not undermined by recognising that there 
are obvious benefits across the life course from attending to capabilities at an early age.93 
Thus, we should recognise that children are ‘simultaneously in processes of being and 
becoming.’94 Further, early direct benefits are not obscured or denied by recognising that 
promoting the capabilities of children has societal benefits beyond the adult the child will 
become. This recognises that children can be ‘key resources for a better future’ with the 
child the ‘centre of an intergenerational transfer of capabilities’ and a ‘vehicle for change’.95 
Another aspect of this future-orientated analysis is less about the transmission of 
capabilities and more aligned with deliberative democracy and collective agency. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
90 There is, however, a significant tension in this position. If an individual wishes to follow a course of action 
that may significantly limit future opportunities then compromising agency may be warranted. Daly attempts 
to address this by setting ‘significant harm’ as the threshold for over ruling children’s decision-making. See 
below, text accompanying n 153.  
91 Archard above n 86, p 31; Fox and Thomson above n 45, p 526. 
92 J Qvortrup, M Bardy, G Sgritta, and H Wintersberger (eds) Childhood Matters: Social Theory, Practice and 
Politics (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994); J Qvortrup ‘Are children human beings or human becomings? A critical 
assessment of outcome thinking’ (2009) 117(3/4) Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali 631, p 631. 
93 See N Peleg ‘Reconceptualising the Child’s Right to Development: Children and the Capabilities Approach’ 
21(3) (2013) International Journal of Children’s Rights 523. 
94 Hart and Brando above n 68, p 294.  
95 M Biggeri, R Libanora, S Mariani, and L Menchini ‘Children conceptualizing their capabilities: results of a 
survey conducted during the first Children’s World Congress on Child Labour’ (2006) 7 Journal of Human 
Development 59, p 65. 
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engages the second theme identified by Biggeri and Santi. As they explain, ‘democracy 
involves participation in public deliberation. Democratic societies should therefore aim to 
produce capable agents.’96 Such capable agents can help build new social capital and 
positively shape social institutions.97 A closer consideration of education, where there has 
been significant work to inform policy and practice, provides an illustration of the richness 
of the approach as well as the possibility of balancing child- and community-focused 
benefits.98  
Both Sen and Nussbaum recognise the intrinsic (child-focused) and instrumental (society-
focused) role of education for human development.99 Sen has argued, for example, that 
education can foster public debate and dialogue about social and political arrangements, 
enabling individuals to take part in decision-making processes at multiple levels (domestic to 
national), and that it can empower marginalised groups to gain access to power and argue 
for redistribution.100 While this work may reflect the future orientated bias in much of the 
early capabilities work to have addressed children, Nussbaum provides a more balanced 
articulation of both the intrinsic importance of children’s capabilities and the broader 
societal benefits. In this she identifies three educational capabilities: critical thinking, world 
citizenship, and imaginative understanding.101 In Nussbaum’s model, critical thinking 
includes the capability to reason logically, to test for consistency, and assess correctness or 
                                                          
96 Biggeri and Santi above n 82.  
97 Ballet, Biggeri, and Comim above n 78, at 33. 
98 J Sandars and CS Hart ‘The capability approach for medical education: AMEE Guide No 97’ (2015) 37(6) Med 
Teach 510. 
99 Others have significantly developed work on capabilities and education, see H Brighouse, School Choice and 
Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); M Saito ‘Amartya Sen’s capability approach to 
education: a critical exploration’ (2003) 37(1) Journal of Philosophy of Education 17; M Walker and E 
Unterhalter (eds) Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Social Justice in Education (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 
100 Nussbaum and Sen (1993) above n 6. See also Dreze and Sen above n 64. 
101 M Nussbaum ‘Education and democratic citizenship: capabilities and quality education’ (2006) 7(3) Journal 
of Human Development 385, p 385. 
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soundness of judgement.102 Young people learn to manage difference and disagreement, 
and to take responsibility for their own reasoning.103 World citizenship describes the ability 
to understand the differences between people and their reasoning, but also shared 
vulnerability that makes understanding essential.104 Imaginative understanding accounts for 
the ability to imagine oneself into another’s circumstances, to intelligently understand 
another’s biography, and the emotions, wishes and desires that person might have.105 
Nussbaum’s account attends to the development of the capability to be knowledgeable. For 
children, this is part of the processes of evolving capabilities. At the same time it is essential 
for the development of capable citizens. To return to Munby LJ and his development of best 
interests jurisprudence. In Re G (Children) [2012] he offered a similar account of the values 
that education should promote. His Lordship stated that in determining what form of 
education was in the best interests of children, a ‘judicial reasonable parent’ should 
recognise that equality of opportunity was a fundamental value and that aspiration should 
be encouraged and facilitated. Importantly, he stated that children should reach adulthood 
best equipped to decide what life they want to lead (what they want to ‘do and be’) and – 
as far as practicable – with the skills to meet these aspirations. He concluded that, ‘our 
objective must be to maximise the child’s opportunities in every sphere of life as they enter 
adulthood.’106  
Elaine Unterhalter and colleagues argue that the approach provides compelling arguments 
for the provision of certain ‘forms of education through which a person can explore her own 
                                                          
102 See also Dreze and Sen’s attention to critical agency, above n 65. 
103 Nussbaum above n 101, pp 388-9. 
104 Ibid, 387. 
105 Ibid. 390. 
106 [2012] EWCA 1233 at para 80.  
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conception of what she has reason to value.’107 The approach provides a robust alternative 
to the human capital approach that in many jurisdictions has been used to assess the value 
of education and shape educational policy.108 Under this model, education is viewed as ‘an 
investment that yields economic returns.’109 The approach challenges the focus on 
economic productivity, technocratic reasoning, and the managerialism that defines the 
human capital paradigm.110 
Practical justifications for a capabilities approach to best interests assessments 
Severine Deneulin has argued that the capabilities approach can be interpreted as a 
normative language.111 The flexibility of the approach allows actors to interpret the 
components of the theory in different settings, and construct context sensitive narratives. 
This is one of the approach’s strengths and is further supported by Sen’s assertion that 
capability lists should be context specific and developed through processes of public 
reasoning. In terms of the methodology employed in operationalising the approach it is 
important to note the acceptance of ‘checklists’ within legal deliberation. In addressing best 
interests assessments it should be noted that section 1(3) of the Children’s Act provides the 
                                                          
107 E Unterhalter, R Vaughan, and M Walker ‘The capability approach and education’ (2007) 13(3) Prospero 13 
p 16. 
108 C Buzzelli ‘The capabilities approach: rethinking agency, freedom, and capital in early education’ (2015) 
16(3) Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood 203; E Unterhalter ‘What is equity in education? Reflections 
from the capability approach’ (2009) 28 Studies in Philosophy and Education 415; K Mok and W Jeong ‘Revising 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach to education for ethical development’ (2016) 17 Asia Pacific Education 
Review 501; MP Cockerill ‘Beyond education for economic productivity alone: the capabilities approach’ (2014) 
66 International Journal of Educational Research 13. 
109 E Unterhalter ‘Education’ in S Deneulin and L Shahani (eds) An Introduction to the Human Development and 
Capability Approach: Freedom and Agency (London: Earthscan/IDRC, 2009), p 207. 
110 M Nussbaum Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010). 
111 S Deneulin ‘Constructing new policy narratives: the capability approach as normative language’ in GA Cornia 
and F Stewart (eds) Towards Human Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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‘welfare checklist’112 that applies to a number of orders available under the Act, and has 
been described as both ‘a most useful aide-memoire’ in other cases,113 and ‘a clear 
statement of what society considers the most important factors in the welfare of 
children.’114 However, for current purposes the checklist is important in terms of the 
broader concern with practice and method. 
Law and policy has seen a proliferation in the use of checklists, now an accepted part of our 
deliberative and practice landscapes. This is seen in statute, case law, and in the provision of 
‘soft law’ in terms of policy guidance. The use of checklists has shaped practice across 
professional ‘high-risk, high reliability groups’.115 They are employed in sectors from aviation 
(since 1938)116 to different areas of medical practice, such as in the operating room,117 
intensive care unit,118 and diagnosis.119 Nevertheless, there is scepticism regarding the 
introduction of checklists, identified by some as part of the bureaucratisation of reasoning 
and decision-making seen with new managerialism. There are also practical concerns. It has 
been argued, for instance, that adding checklists into high pressure and time limited 
                                                          
112 Section 1(3) provides that in making decisions for children in these situations ‘the court shall have regard in 
particular to’: 
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in light of his age and 
understanding); 
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs; 
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in circumstances; 
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; 
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; 
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the 
question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; 
(g) the range of powers available to the court under the Act in the proceedings in question. 
113 Re B (Change of Surname) [1996] 1 FLR 791 at 793, CA. 
114 Law Commission, Family Law: Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody (Report No. 172), para [3.19]. 
115 JW Ely, L Graber, P Croskerry ‘Checklists to reduce diagnostic errors’ (2011) 86(3) Academic Medicine 307, p 
307. 
116 A Gawnde The Checklist Manifesto: How to get things right (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009). 
117 R Karl ‘Briefings, checklists, geese, and surgical safety’ (2010) 17 Annuls of Surgical Ontology 8. 
118 P Pronvost, D Needham, S Berenholtz et al ‘An intervention to decrease catheter-related bloodstream 
infections in the ICU’ (2006) 355 New England Journal of Medicine 2725. 
119 Ely, Graber, and Croskerry, above n 115, p 307; M Sibbald, ABH de Bruin, and JJG van Merrienbore 
‘Checklists improve experts diagnostic decisions’ (2013) 43 Medical Education 301. 
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processes can lead to ‘cognitive load’, compounding the demands that already exist in high 
level decision-making.120 Alternatively, they are seen to contribute to ‘expertise reversal’ 
and the undermining of established skills.121 Finally, critics challenge the implicit belief that 
lists are in some way neutral: ‘safer’ than the vagaries of human reasoning which may be 
fraught with bias and unpredictability.122 
Acknowledging this criticism, the capabilities approach demonstrates that is it nevertheless 
possible to have a normative core and operationalise this through guidelines that are 
philosophically and empirically informed. If best interests assessments are being made with 
an implicit notion of ‘the good life’, as Herring, Foster and others argue, we can and should 
develop a framework that makes this explicit and is informed by a theoretical and empirical 
evidence-base. The next section turns to work that has sought to develop capability lists for 
children. Whilst this has taken place in a number of contexts,123 given the immediate focus is 
the UK, the work of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) is examined. 
The UK Equality Act 2006 aimed to consolidate existing provisions, advance protection from 
discrimination, and promote equality. The Act charged the EHRC with the duty to monitor 
inequalities and progress in achieving social change. In response, the EHRC worked with the 
Government Equalities Office, Scottish Government, Welsh Assembly, Office of National 
Statistics, and others to develop a comprehensive measurement framework for assessing 
                                                          
120 S Kalyuga, P Ayres, P Chandler, and P Sweller ‘The expertise reversal effect’ 38 (2003) Educational 
Psychologist 23. 
121 S Kalyuga ‘Expertise reversal effect and its implications for learner-tailored instruction’ 19 (2007) 
Educational Psychology Review 509. 
122 See, Gwande above n 116. 
123 See, for example, M Biggeri ‘Children’s valued capabilities’ in M Walker and E Unterhalter (eds) Amartya 
Sen’s Capability Approach and Social Justice in Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); M Dominguez, 
L del Moral-Espin, L Gálvez Muñoz, ‘A well-being of their own: Children’s perspectives of well-being from the 
capabilities approach’ 26(1) (2019) Childhood 22; Biggeri, Libanova, Mariani, Menchini, above n 95. 
 
Page | 24 
 
equality and human rights in the UK in the twenty-first century.124 Academic input was 
provided by members of the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) at the London 
School of Economics,125 and the processes of public deliberation were managed by Ipsos-
MORI.126 The EHRC engaged not just with a broad range of professionals concerned with 
child development or working with children and young people, but also with young people 
themselves. This reflects the commitment within the approach to public deliberation in the 
process of identifying and articulating relevant capabilities and the importance of the 
capability to engage in decision-making processes that affect you.127 In this regard, 
information from young people regarding the capabilities that they value should form part 
of any starting point. This would be consistent with the spirit of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), if not the processes of its inception. As Ballet, Bigerri and 
Comim comment, no child ‘participated in drafting the Convention and, more generally, the 
rights were prepared during international conventions in a top-down fashion, without roots 
at local level’.128 
The purpose in addressing this work is threefold. First, it provides an opportunity to 
illustrate the key features of the capability approach in the context of its application. 
Second, it draws attention to the empirical work that underpins the operationalization of 
the approach. Again, this reflects a core commitment to agency and participation. Third, it 
details the construction of a children’s capability list. In this, it demonstrates a potential 
                                                          
124 S Alkire, F Bastagli, T Burchardt, D Clark, H Holder, S Ibrahim, M Munoz, P Terrazas, T Tsang, and P Vizard 
Developing the Equality Measurement Framework: Selecting the Indicators (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, Research report 31, 2009). 
125 ECHR above n 9 p 3. 
126 Ipsos MORI Consulting for a Capability List: Research Study Conducted by Ipsos MORI for the Equalities 
Review (Ipsos MORI, 2007), available at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100702224210/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesre
view/upload/assets/www.theequalitiesreview.org.uk/morireport.pdf  
127 Sen (2010), above n 6. 
128 Biggeri, Ballet, and Comim above n 78, p 39. 
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methodology for defining - and the likely broad parameters of - a capabilities framework for 
best interests decision-making. This would provide the evidence-based values and 
deliberative architecture to underpin assessments.  
A CAPABILITY LIST FOR CHILDREN  
In meeting its statutory duty to develop a measurement framework, the EHRC started a 
process which would first lead to the adult focused Equality Measurement Framework 
(EMF). The methodology and EMF went on to shape the Children’s Measurement 
Framework (CMF). The initial task of generating the adult EMF was underpinned by three 
key inputs: the capabilities approach as developed by Sen; the international human rights 
framework; and extensive consultation with the general public, including individuals and 
groups at risk of discrimination and disadvantage.129 In accepting Sen’s articulation of the 
approach as their starting point, CASE devised a two-stage process. The first stage involved 
deriving a ‘minimum core capability list’ from international human rights documentation.130 
While this had a number of important advantages, including building on international 
processes that are – at least in part - democratic and deliberative, they nonetheless fail to 
live up to the ‘central role for broader processes of democratic deliberation and debate’ 
reserved by the approach.131 Responding to this, the second stage involved processes of 
deliberation and debate ‘giving the general public and those at risk of discrimination and 
                                                          
129 Alkire et al above n 124. 
130 This required working inductively from core international human rights to determine a ‘set of underlying (or 
implicitly defined) states of being and doing … protected and promoted in international law.’ Ibid, p 100. The 
main sources for this work were the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These were supplemented by other treaties. 
131 T Burchardt and P Vizard ‘Operationalizing’ the Capability Approach as a Basis for Equality and Human 
Rights Monitoring in Twenty‐first‐century Britain, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12:1 (2011) 
91-119 p 102. 
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disadvantage a defining role in identifying and justifying the selection of central and basic 
capabilities.’132 
This work resulted in the following list of Central and Basic Capabilities: to be alive; to live in 
physical security; to be healthy; to be knowledgeable, to understand and reason, and to 
have skills to participate in society; to enjoy a comfortable standard of living, with 
independence and security; to engage in productive and valued activities; to enjoy 
individual, family and social life; to participate in decision-making, have a voice and 
influence; of being and expressing yourself, and having self-respect; of knowing you will be 
protected and treated fairly by the law. 133 It is clear that while important, this list provides 
limited guidance and behind each identified capability is a fuller articulation of what is 
involved in recognising and promoting that capability. These details derive from the public 
consultation and so give important insight into how the public conceives of these freedoms 
and opportunities. To give a discipline relevant example, listed below is the further detail 
that attaches to legal security - the capability of knowing you will be protected and treated 
fairly by the law: 
 Know you will be treated with equality and non-discrimination before the law; 
 Be secure that the law will protect you from intolerant behaviour, and from reprisals 
if you make a complaint; 
 Be free from arbitrary arrest and detention; 
 Have fair conditions of detention; 
 Have the right to a fair trial; 
 Have access to affordable and high-quality information and advocacy as necessary; 
 Have freedom of movement; 
 Have the right to name, gender and nationality; 
 Own property and financial products including insurance, social security and 
pensions in your own right; 
 Know your privacy will be respected. 
 
                                                          
132 Ibid. 
133 T Burchardt and P Visard Developing an Equality Measurement Framework: A List of Substantive Freedoms 
for Adults and Children (Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research Report 18, 2009). 
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Having generated the adult list, the EHRC moved to commission a Children’s Measurement 
Framework (CMF). The starting place was the adult list which was then assessed in light of 
the UNCRC and national frameworks concerned with children’s welfare and rights.134 
Moving to the second phase, CASE and Ipsos-MORI conducted two workshops with parents 
and children from the general public to refine the new provisional list. The first round of 
consultations engaged teenagers between the ages of 13 and 16. The second included those 
between the ages of 9 and 12, and parents of children under the age of 8.135 A third and 
final consultation subjected a provisional list to scrutiny by experts from children’s 
organisations and other stakeholders.136 These three stages resulted in the final children’s 
list. 
Whilst the key identified capabilities are the same, the process generated differences in the 
detail supporting each capability. Although these cannot be covered in detail, the example 
of the capability of knowing you will be protected and treated fairly by the law can be 
returned to. Again, much of the detail is the same as the EMF, however there are key 
differences that illustrate the sensitivity to age that the process captured. Thus, this 
included that: prison should only be a last resort for children; there should be a minimum 
age of criminal responsibility; there should be access to high-quality information, and 
mechanisms for complaints and advocacy as necessary, which are all specifically designed 
                                                          
134 T Burchardt, T Tsang, and P Vizard Specialist Consultation on the List of Central and Valuable Capabilities for 
Children (Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research Report 41, 2009), p 4. Thus, the list is informed by 
the Every Child Matters Framework, available at  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272064/
5860.pdf); the Welsh Assembly’s Seven Core Aims for Children and Young People, available at  
(https://gov.wales/docs/dsjlg/publications/cyp/151106-core-aims-comprehensive-version-en.pdf); and the 
Scottish Government’s Getting it Right for Every Child, available at 
https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/People/Young-People/gettingitright. 
135 Burchardt, Tsang and Vizard above n 134, p 4. 
136 This included subject specialists from government units, non-profits, non-governmental organisations and 
academics from England, Scotland and Wales. Ibid. 
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for children; and that 16 and 17 year olds should have access to property and financial 
products in their own right. The final element in the supporting detail is that children should 
have their own interests the primary consideration in legal proceedings concerning their 
parents.137 
Members of CASE have identified the development of the EMF and CMF as the beginning of 
a broader policy mobilisation of the approach.138 Similarly, Ballet, Biggeri and Comim argue 
that the approach can become a framework for normative evaluation and together with 
human rights ‘can produce a cogent set of policy prescriptions.’139 In contributing to this 
work and arguing for an extension of the applied reach of the framework, an important 
question remains regarding the methodology. In developing the CMF the starting point was 
the EMF, which built on collective expressions of valued adult freedoms and liberties. This 
was subsequently developed through work with children and young people and a 
consideration of national children focused standards. Nevertheless, there remain questions 
regarding the extent to which the adult focused foundations limit the Framework’s ability to 
capture and promote what is specifically important about childhood and early adulthood, 
and what must be protected and advanced.140 
 
IMPLEMENTING THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH IN LAW 
This article aims to set out and provoke two agendas for change. First, the article mobilizes 
the capabilities approach to provide a response to long recognised failings in the best 
interests standard, outlining the further work needed to align the standard with the 
                                                          
137 Burchardt and Vizard above n 131. 
138 Burchardt, Tsang and Vizard above n 134, 109-10. 
139 Ballet, Biggeri, and Comim above n 78, pp 39-40. For a discussion of the sympathetic relationship between 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Capabilities approach see Hart and Brando, above n 68. 
140 I am grateful to Helen Stalford for raising this point. 
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approach. Second, it seeks to encourage a fuller engagement with the capabilities approach 
in legal studies.  In order to do both, and before detailing the necessary elements of any 
implementation strategy for law, it is helpful to consider some of the criticism that has been 
levelled at the framework and that may be hampering development of capabilities work in 
legal studies. 
The approach has been the focus for varied criticism. Some of this has been generated by 
early ‘sloppy use of terms’ and ‘conceptual confusion’,141 perhaps the inevitable growing 
pains of an emerging interdisciplinary language. Other criticism has been misplaced. Some 
have questioned, for instance, the priorities of the approach. As a theory of justice it has 
been charged that focusing predominantly at the local and national scale has meant a 
failure to address profound injustices created by the global economic system and its 
institutional structures, such as global trade agreements.142 This, and similar criticism, is 
misdirected as the framework seeks to enable interpersonal comparison of well-being and 
advantage. As Ingrid Robeyns argues, given the focus on well-being, it is legitimate to argue 
that capability theorists should address ‘the most urgent cases of injustice, investigate their 
underlying causal processes and mechanisms, and concentrate on the development of 
solutions.’143  
There are two strands of criticism that may be more significant obstacles to legal 
engagement with the approach and which therefore need to be addressed. The first is the 
charge that the approach is too complex to be operationalised. Robert Sugden, for instance, 
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points to the ‘rich array of functionings’ identified by Sen, and the scope for disagreement 
amongst reasonable people as to what constitutes the good life. Given such complexity he 
asks whether it provides a ‘realistic alternative’ to existing frameworks or methods.144 Rawls 
similarly claimed that Sen’s approach is ‘unworkable’, in that it calls ‘for more information 
than political science can conceivably acquire and sensibly apply’.145 Adoption of the 
capabilities approach in diverse national and supra-national contexts, and work to 
implement it through context specific capabilities lists, has done much to deflate such 
criticism. 
The second criticism comes from a misreading of the theory. It is commonly charged that 
the approach is too individualistic. This is meant in two senses: that it works with an 
atomistic view of individuals, and, related to this, that it fails to adequately address 
structural inequalities and experiences of disadvantage shared by groups.146 As already 
noted, the individual is the object of ethical concern within the approach and it may be that 
this is misunderstood to mean that it is concerned with the fictional decontextualised 
individual of classic liberal thought. However, the approach is primarily concerned with the 
social and institutional structures within which individuals are embedded and the extent to 
which these promote or limit opportunities and flourishing.147 While the approach relies on 
an ethical or normative individualism (the individual and not an aggregate or proxy measure 
is the focus for ethical attention), this does not imply ontologically individualism, that is, a 
fictional atomised individual floating free of the many social networks that shape, support, 
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and constrain life.148 The consistent attention that Sen, Nussbaum, and many others have 
paid to the structural barriers and enablers that impact individuals and groups makes the 
persistence of this criticism surprising.149 This criticism, whilst groundless, may have 
negatively impacted on engagement with the capabilities approach in socio-legal studies 
where rich understandings of human sociality are valued and flourish. 
Returning to best interests assessments, this final section provides further necessary 
guidance for meaningfully implementing a capabilities approach. This seeks to ensure that 
the use of the approach is cognisant of the broader children’s rights framework, that it does 
not wither to a normatively empty checklist, and that it addresses these criticisms of the 
approach. 
To achieve this, there are four elements that must be included in any implementation 
framework. First, those making assessments, or otherwise deliberating in the space of 
capabilities, must engage with the foundational proposition that welfare and flourishing are 
best advanced by promoting an individual’s freedoms to ‘be and do what they have reason 
to value’.150 So the starting point is the premise that flourishing is best supported by 
maximising the opportunities that individuals have to choose from as they determine and 
pursue their life goals. This provides the essential normative foundation for subsequent 
deliberation and decision-making. 
Second, this foundational proposition centres not only the core commitment to 
opportunity, but also highlights the place of agency and the need to include children and 
young people in decision-making. This aligns with the right of children to be heard in 
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proceedings affecting them contained in Article 12(2) of the UNCRC. While it is possible to 
identify limited instances of good practice, and acknowledge important calls for 
improvement,151 it is clear from national and international surveys that children are not 
being adequately afforded this right.152  Aoife Daly has made an important intervention in 
an attempt to strengthen the participation and agency of children. Daly advocates replacing 
the right to be heard with the Children’s Autonomy Principle. This states that in best 
interests assessments children should get to choose how they are involved and the 
outcome, unless this is likely to cause ‘significant harm’ to that child.153 The argument here 
is compatible with Daly’s principle. Indeed, the focus on capabilities may provide the 
needed guidance for what constitutes ‘significant harm’.154 That is to say, the principle could 
be reformulated to identify ‘significant loss of opportunity or capability’ as the limit to the 
principle. 
Third, this foundational belief in maximising opportunities or freedoms has been 
operationalised through capability lists. These are context specific lists that are generated 
though processes of public reasoning. The article highlights the CMF developed by the EHRC 
as an example of the process whereby a framework for assessments may be developed. In 
the case of the CMF, this identifies capabilities that are essential for flourishing and the 
detail behind each capability gives a further resource to assist both monitoring and 
deliberation. Such context and purpose specific capability lists are important in moving the 
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approach beyond a general framework155 and challenge the criticism that the approach is 
‘unworkable’.156 
Fourth, in assessing capabilities in the context of individual well-being it is not enough to 
simply identify the appropriate list of opportunities, rather we must address a person’s 
ability to exercise their agency in the context of these opportunities. Thus, we must attend 
to the barriers and enablers that effect the realisation of these opportunities and their 
conversion into functionings. This illustrates the understanding of individualism embedded 
in the approach. So while the well-being of the individual is the focus of ethical concern, the 
individual is simultaneously recognised as located in relationships, networks, and structures 
that can either support or constrain opportunity and flourishing. Returning to the EHRC, 
Burchardt and Visard identify treatment and autonomy as key considerations in this regard. 
Therefore, the fourth requirement is the need to consider an individual’s ‘empowerment, 
choice and control in relation to critical decisions’.157 Thus, as well as identifying the 
substantive freedoms and opportunities available to people, we also need to assess the 
quality of the options, constraints and barriers they experience, and their treatment by 
others.158 Daly’s attention to the need for ‘autonomy support’ for children and young 
people in best interests processes aligns with this. As she states, autonomy support should 
mean ‘non-controlling, impartial information and support to form and/or express views and 
decisions about a best interests matter.’159 At the same time, decision-making should aim to 
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maximise the child’s ‘empowerment, choice and control’160 beyond the court or other best 
interests process. 
Any implementation framework must aim to foster a developed understanding of the 
capabilities approach and the architecture needed to promote capabilities, including the 
capability to be involved in decision-making that affects you. This should benefit the overall 
assessment process as well as helping to avoid adoption of the approach being reduced to 
the bare application of a checklist. Given the complexity of much legal deliberation and 
reasoning this is not an overly onerous proposal. Rather, it should be understood as offering 
a means of structuring judgements of the ‘good life’ that are already believed to take place 
in best interests assessments. In this, it provides a robust and empirically supported 
understanding of what is required to promote well-being and flourishing.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The best interests standard is a long established principle of domestic and international 
welfare law, policy, and practice. It is generally accepted that the best interests of children 
and young people should be the primary or paramount concern when making decisions with 
regard to care or upbringing. The standard has become ubiquitous, yet as Stalford and 
Hollingsworth observe, this ‘belies the complex, speculative and often highly subjective 
nature of a process that seeks to determine definitively what is best for children.’161 
Addressing the wide body of criticism directed at the standard, this article has highlighted 
how these criticisms may be understood in terms of values, acknowledging that the 
standard may lack underpinning values or may act as a smokescreen for discriminatory 
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values. Further, we may see reliance on incompletely articulated or empirically 
unsubstantiated values as judicial approaches to a child’s best interests draw on intuition or 
‘common sense’. 
In response, it is argued that the capabilities approach can provide a flexible normative 
framework that has been developed through four decades of interdisciplinary work. It builds 
on a familiar philosophical tradition that has long interrogated what it means to be human 
and has attempted to articulate how we might understand and promote flourishing and 
well-being. The foundational proposition that we should focus on maximising the 
opportunities and freedoms that people have to do and be what they have reason to value 
is easily understood. This proposition is then operationalised in different contexts through 
capability lists. Such lists, however, are interpreted as part of the fundamental commitment 
to agency and therefore are not hollowed out to a purely bureaucratic application. In this 
context, the article has argued for a preliminary engagement with the methodology and 
children’s capability list generated by the EHRC. In developing their methodology, CASE 
challenge the sceptical position of those like Rawls and Sugden who claim that it is too 
complex to be workable.162 
Even as we acknowledge the diverse areas of legal studies and practice where the approach 
has begun to be explored,163 the capabilities approach has not made the inroads into law 
that has been seen in a significant number of other disciplines and fields. This article has 
provided a clear example of where the approach might make a real impact and has 
addressed a number of criticisms that may have hindered engagement with the theory. It 
has provided the conceptual and methodological justification for its use in child law, and 
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detailed the steps needed to develop a more effective best interests process. This work, 
providing the foundations for a necessary reconceptualization of best interests assessments, 
has relevance beyond the current context into other, far ranging, areas of legal studies and 
practice. 
 
